It provides ? special channel to deliver and promote his wicked designs, Bin Laden has called it ? ‘religious duty’ for his minions to obtain and use WMD against the infidels, but he knows that his terrorist network needs help. It is only in the movies that Dr No is able to create the facilities to manufacture and deliver WMD. In the real world of terrorism, the capacity to make and utilize these weapons requires the help of ? government. Aum Shinrikyo, ? Japanese cult, tried to kill thousands of commuters with ? potent nerve agent but managed to kill only ? dozen after spending somewhere around thirty million dollars.
The loss of these lives was tragic but much less than expected and displayed the complexity of operations using these agents. The cult was not able to produce the chemical (sarin) in sufficient purity and resorted to using ? most primitive delivery system—carrying it on ? train and piercing bags of it with tips of umbrellas. ? government working with ? terrorist organization would produce ? more lethal combination. 3 In light of this threat, it appears as if the only long-term solution is to eliminate the regime in Baghdad. Some would argue that there is no need to rush into war.
But one wonders how realistic this option is in view of the track record of the regime. Is it realistic to believe that Iraq would comply with inspectors? It did not the first time around, not in toto, would the UN impose the necessary sanctions and penalties if it did not? Or would it ignore certain closed doors and cave in as it did before to Iraqi demands? And even if unmolested, would the inspectors catch the regime in its lies, knowing that it is likely to play ? shell game and was given four years to hide its weapons? (Bruce 2003 44)
Donne’s fatalistic maxim succinctly defines the essential context that modern intelligence services function within, and the variables determining their relative fortunes. Their experiences suggest that they are very human institutions largely shaped by the vagaries of circumstances beyond their control, not to mention misfortune and luck. As refined information used by the state to further national goals and policies, intelligence is directed, collected, analyzed and disseminated (the ‘intelligence cycle’) within the milieu of international politics.
Intelligence work must therefore function within the ‘anarchical society’ of Great Powers. 1 Equally significant is the extent to which intelligence functionaries serve at the mercy of their policy masters. The intelligence officers themselves, in their various professional incarnations, are the ‘desperate men’ in this formulation, striving as they do to carry out their risky and/or problematic duties in the face of inertia and outright opposition on the part of rivals, enemies, and occasionally their own countrymen.
It is unlikely that any intelligence service in history has ever completely escaped subjugation to such restrictive bondage. “As mentioned in the previous chapter, the war on al Qaeda should be ? deliberate broad-front attack. It is already that in practice, but the rationale for sustaining this approach is less established and troubles are certain because such ? strategy requires relating the efforts of multiple agencies, subagencies, and even nations, and it sometimes necessitates rapid action.
This would seem to require two enhancements of capability which may at first seem contradictory, but they are complementary and equally important. “(Paul 2002 31) These facts hold particularly true for the office of Strategic Services mission in London, America’s critical liaison and operational intelligence outpost during the Second World War. Expanding to ? peak of 2,800 personnel in 1944, OSS/London was originally established in October 1941 with the arrival of ? single representative, followed by ? staff nucleus the day after America’s entry into the war.
Eventually consisting of contingents from the four major OSS branches-Research and Analysis, Secret Intelligence, Special operations, and X-2 (counter-intelligence)-the mission served as ? focal point for Anglo-American intelligence relations in the decisive theatre in the war against Germany. The London mission was at the heart of OSS relations with British intelligence, and as such it personified the essence of that connection in the Allied war effort.